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III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

This case arises from the employment relationship between Plaintiff-Appellant
Tina Venable (hereinafter "Venable"), in her status as employee, and DefendantRespondent Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc. (hereinafter "Internet Auto"), in its status as
employer.

This appeal implicates Venable's claim for wrongful discharge of

employment in violation of public policy.

See Count Two of the First Amended

Complaint, R., Vol. I, p. 285. More specifically, Venable contends she was wrongfully
terminated for first reporting her observations that Internet Auto was violating the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act (sometimes hereinafter the "Act"), and then for her refusal to
commit or to participate in the commitment of violations of the Act. See Idaho Code §
48-60 I , et seq.
The remainder of this brief shall demonstrate that the grant of summary judgment
111

favor of Internet Auto was not an appropriate resolution of Venable's claim for

wrongful discharge in contravention of public policy.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below

Venable filed her original Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on October 6,
2011, in Ada County, Idaho. R., Vol. I, pp. 15-22. It contained the following causes of
action: (1) Breach of the Employment Contract and the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing Implied Therein; (2) Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy; and (3)
the IntentionallNegligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Id.

Internet Auto filed

Defendant Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc. 's Answer to Complaint and Demand for Jury
Trial on April 11,2012. R., Vol. I, pp. 23-30. Thereafter, on August 28,2012, Venable
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filed her First Amended Complaint and Demandfor Jury Trial. R., Vol. I, pp. 281-288.
The First Amended Complaint added a fourth cause of action for Slander Per Se. Id. It
was Answered by Internet Auto on September 7,2012. R., Vol. I, pp. 300-305.
Even before the filing of the First Amended Complaint, Internet Auto had moved
the district court for summary judgment on July 10, 2012. R., Vol. I, pp. 29-30. Its
motion was accompanied by the Affidavit of Phillip S. Oberrecht in Support of Defendant

Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc. 's Motion for Summary Judgment CR., Vol. I, pp. 31-33),
the Memorandum in Support of Defendant Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc. 's Motion for

Summary Judgment CR., Vol. I, pp. 185-201), and the Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts in Support of Defendant Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc. 's Motion for Summary
Judgment CR., Vol. I., pp. 202-209).

In opposition to summary judgment, Venable

lodged her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc's

Motion for Summary Judgment (R., Vol. 1, pp. 257-269), supported by the Affidavit of
Sam Johnson in Opposition to Defendant Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc. 's Motion for
Summary Judgment CR., Vol. I, pp. 227-229),
Thereafter, the district court granted Internet Auto's motion for summary
jUdgment on the claim for breach of contract, the claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, but denied the motion with respect to the claim for negligent infliction
of emotional distress by way of Memorandum Decision and Order Granting In Part

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated September 12,2012. R., Vol. I, pp.
306-316. More particular to this appeal, as to the cause of action for wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy, the district court reserved ruling until further discovery
could be completed. Id. at p. 315.
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After further discovery, on December 27, 2012, Venable filed her Affidavit of

Plaintiff in Opposition to Defendant Internet Auto Rent & Sales, Inc. 's Motion for
Summary Judgment Re: Claim for Wrongfitl Discharge in Violation of Public Policy. R.,
Vol. I, pp. 336-340.

It incorporated as exhibits excerpts from Venable's deposition

transcript, the Affidavit of Robert William Heath, and excerpts from the deposition
transcript of witness Joey Winter. Id. After hearing, the district court granted summary
judgment to Internet Auto on Venable's claim for wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy on January 30, 2013.

See Memorandum Decision and Order on

Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment Denying for Count IV and Granting for
Count IL at R, Vol. I, pp. 372-382.
Next, on February 6, 20l3, Venable filed Plaint(ff's Motion and Memorandum for

Reconsideration of the Grant of Summary Judgment on the Claim for Wrongful
Discharge in Violation of Public Policy. R., Vol. I, pp. 383-393. It was denied by the
district court on February 27,2013. See Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider

Summary Judgment on Count II, at R, Vol. I, pp. 409-416.
The matter proceeded to trial on Venable's claims for slander per se, and the
negligent infliction of emotional distress. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Internet
Auto on both of these remaining counts, on March 15,2013. R., Vol. I, pp. 420-424.
Shortly after trial, Venable filed Plaintiff's Second Motion for Reconsideration of

the Grant of Summary Judgment on the Claim for Wrongful Discharge in Violation of
Public Policy. R., Vol. I, pp. 427-430. It was based upon the sworn testimony "proffered
from witnesses Chris Plaza, Robert Heath, and Tina Venable during the jury trial which
commenced on March 11, 2013." Id. at p. 428. The district court denied the motion by
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Order Denying Plaintiff's Second Motion to Reconsider Summary Judgment on Count II
R., Vol. I, pp. 437-444.
Venable timely filed her Notice of Appeal on April 22, 2013. R., Vol. 1, pp. 444448. A First Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on August 5, 2013. R., Vol. 1, pp.
456-462.

C.

Statement of Facts
1.

On or about March 15, 20 11, the parties entered into a contract of

employment, whereby Venable was hired to fill the position of "Internet Manager" for
Internet Auto. See First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, at R., Vol. I, p.
282.
2.

Before starting her employment with Internet Auto, Venable had

spent much of her adult life working in the automobile sales industry, where she had been
employed by new and used car dealerships, for whom she had held a variety of
management level positions.

Over the years, Venable had received training in every

aspect of the business model, including sales and sales management, finance and finance
management, warranty coverage, gap insurance, lender acquisition fees, and business
ethics. Altogether Venable has accumulated roughly fifteen (15) years of experience in
the auto sales industry. R., Vol. I, p. 337.
3.

Based upon her roughly fifteen (15) years of experience in auto

sales, Venable understood and believed in good faith that the following acts and practices
she observed at the dealership were in violation of not only industry standards but also in
violation of the Idaho consumer protection act and/or the Truth in Lending Act:
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a. Internet Auto illegally passed on acqulSltlOn fees to consumers
which were in fact owed by the dealership and then illegally
charged the consumer interest thereon;
b. Internet Auto illegally charged for auto warranties in transactions
where the consumer was purchasing the vehicle in the "As Is"
condition;
c. Internet Auto illegally charged for gap insurance in transactions
where the consumer opted out of gap coverage;
d. Internet Auto falsely advertised vehicles "for sale" which did not
even exist in the inventory and falsely misrepresented the history
of pre-owned vehicles to consumers;
e. Internet Auto sold vehicles to consumers
advertised prices;
f.

III

excess of their

Internet Auto engaged in the deceptive practice of failing to
disclose all material contractual and financial terms to consumers,
engaging in what is known in the industry as "packed payments";

g. Internet Auto deceived consumers into believing the dealership had
agreed to lower the sales price of units when in fact it had only
extended the term of the loan, and thereby reduced the monthly
payment amount disclosed to the consumer;
h. Internet Auto further deceived consumers by employing a variety
of "bait and switch" tactics designed to trick consumers into
believing they were to receive one vehicle only to then substitute it
later for another vehicle of lesser quality and value;
R., Vol. I, pp. 337-38.
4.

Venable's deposition was taken in this matter on June 5, 2012. R.,

Vol. I, p. 338. During her deposition, Venable testified from her personal knowledge
and observations as an employee of Internet Auto, how the dealership engaged in the
unfair and deceptive acts and practices listed above. Jd.
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5.

The sworn statements contained in the Affidavit of Robert William

Heath corroborate the existence of the deceptive practices Venable has described
above. R., Vol. I, pp. 354-357. Mr. Heath averred in his affidavit that:
During the time of my employment at Internet Auto Rent &
Sales, General Sales Manager Chris Plaza instructed us to
sell packed payments to customers. The practice of selling
packed payments involved charging customers extra for
warranties and gap insurance that the customers had no
knowledge of. We were also told to charge higher prices
for cars than the prices listed in the adveIiisements on the
internet, when a customer had not seen the advertised price.
General Sales Manager Chris Plaza also instructed us to
pass on acquisition fees to customers which were charged
by lending institutions in subprime transactions and were to
be paid directly by the dealership to the lender. He further
instructed us to include the transaction fee charged in credit
card transactions in with the purchase price;
Chris Plaza also directed us to put customers in cars even
though we knew through our experience in the industry the
buyer would not likely qualify for a loan, but this way the
customer was able to drive the car off the lot and take it
home. Then the dealership would contact the buyer a few
days later and explain the deal fell through and therefore
the buyer had to return the car. Upon the buyer's return of
the car to the dealership, we were instructed to switch the
buyer into a different car which would bring a higher return
to the dealership. Buyers often felt obliged to buy the
substituted car so as to avoid any embmTassment associated
with having a new car to having no car at all;
Internet Auto Rent & Sales would also advertise units for
sale in Boise when the car was not within the Boise
inventory, but may have been sitting on the lot in Reno or
Winnemucca. The ads however clearly depicted the car to
be on the lot in Boise;
Chris Plaza recognized many of Internet Auto Rent & Sales
customers were in desperate need to secure some form of
transportation, and so he directed us to take advantage of
the situation by employing the tactics referenced above and
others. If we did not go along with his tactics, he would
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start to take away our access to computer programs, and
our access to work deals and gain approval for deals;
Id. (Emphasis added).

6.

Venable reported the occurrence of the above acts and practices to

the General Sales Manager, Mr. Chris Plaza, and other members of the management team
but was first told that she should mind her own business and was later told that this is
how "we do business" and to get on board or words to that affect. R., Vol. I, p. 338-339.
7.

Shortly after reporting the deceptive acts and practices to Mr.

Plaza, Venable discovered that her access to key programs used by the dealership had
been denied which made it more difficult for her to complete sales transactions on behalf
ofInternet Auto. R., Vol. I, p. 339.
8.

On or about April 21, 2011, Venable's employment relationship

with Internet Auto was terminated. Venable contends she was fired because she refused
to break the law. Id.
9.

The sworn testimony of Mr. Joey Winter taken in this matter on

December 11, 2012, likewise corroborates Venable's claim for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy. Mr. Winter was also employed by Internet Auto during the
term of Venable's employment with the dealership. Id. Mr. Winter held a management
position with Internet Auto. Id.
10.

Mr. Winter testified from personal knowledge how he recalled that

Venable had made reports to Mr. Plaza about the existence of improper conduct
occurring at the dealership. See Winter Depo. Tr., p. 65, L. 13 - p. 66, L. 3 at R., Vol. I,
p.368.
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11.

Mr. Winter further testified how it was Mr. Plaza who barred

Venable's access to computer programs used at the dealership. See Winter Depo. Tr., p.
75, L. 7 - p. 76, L. 23 at R., Vol. I, p. 371;

12.

Mr. Winter also confirmed that it was Mr. Plaza who instructed

Mr. Winter to fire Venable. Winter Depo. Tr., p. 68, LI. 4-19 at R. Vol. I, p. 369.
IV.

V.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Whether the district court erred by granting summary judgment in
favor of the DefendantlRespondent on Plaintiff/Appellant's claim for
wrongful discharge of employment in violation of public policy.

B.

Whether the district court erred in denying Plaintiff/Appellant's
Second Motion for Reconsideration of the grant of summary
judgment on the claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy based upon evidence adduced during the jury trial on the
related Slander Per Se Claim.

C.

Whether Plaintiff/Appellant is entitled to an award of attorney fees on
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3)

ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review for Summary Judgment/Reconsideration.

"When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this Court uses the same
standard employed by the trial cOUl1 when deciding such a motion." Nation v. State,
Dept. o/Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 184, 158 P.3d 953,960 (2007); see also Sorenson v.
St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., Inc., 141 Idaho 754, 758, 118 P.3d 86, 90 (2005). Thus,

the following standard of review applies on this appeal:
The burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all
times upon the moving party. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 769, 820
P.2d at 364; Petricevich, 92 Idaho at 868, 452 P.2d at 365. This
burden is onerous because even "circumstantial" evidence can
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create a genuine issue of material fact. McCoy, 120 Idaho at
769, 820 P.2d at 364; Petricevich, 92 Idaho at 868, 452 P.2d at
365.
Harris v. State, Dept. of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159

(1992).
"[A]ll doubts are to be resolved against the moving
party." Ashley v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 69, 593 P.2d 402,
404 (1979). The motion must be denied "if the evidence is
such that conflicting inferences can be drawn therefrom and
if reasonable [people] might reach different conclusions."
Id.
Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 470, 716 P.2d 1238, 1242 (1986) .

. . . [T]he Court must liberally construe facts in the eXlstmg
record in favor of the nonmoving party, and draw all reasonable
inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party.
Thompson, 126 Idaho at 529, 887 P.2d at 1036; Bonz v.
Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991).
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d
360, 364 (1991). If there are conflicting inferences contained in
the record or reasonable minds might reach different
conclusions, summary judgment must be denied. Bonz, 119
Idaho at 541, 808 P.2d at 878.
State v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 129 Idaho 353, 356, 924 P.2d 615, 618 (1996).

The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the
sound discretion of the trial court. Campbell v. Reagan, 144 Idaho 254, 258, 159 P.3d
891, 895 (2007); Carnell v. Barker Mgmt. Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 329, 48 P.3d 651, 658
(2002). When considering a motion to reconsider under I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2), the district
court should take into account any new facts or information presented by the moving
party bearing on the correctness of the district court's order. Coeur d' Alene Mining Co.
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v. First Nat'l Bank of N Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). The
moving party carries the burden of either bringing new facts to the attention of the court
or drawing the court's attention to errors of law or fact in the initial decision. Johnson v.
Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 473,147 P.3d 100,105 (Ct. App. 2006).
B.

The District Court Erred by Granting Summary Judgment in favor of
Internet Auto on Venable's Claim for Wrongful Discharge of
Employment in Violation of Public Policy.
1. Idaho recognizes a narrow exception to "at-will"
employment when the employer's motivation for the
termination contravenes public policy.

The Idaho Supreme Court has long recognized a narrow exception to at-will
employment where the employer's motivation for the termination contravenes public
policy. Van v. PortneufMed Center, 147 Idaho 552, 561, 212 P.3d 982, 991 (2009); see
also Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 333, 563 P.2d 54, 57 (1977). In
order for the public policy exception to apply, the discharged employee must show she
was telminated for engaging in protected activity, which includes: (1) refusing to commit
an unlawful act; (2) performing an important public obligation; or (3) exercising certain
rights or privileges. Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 640641,272 P.3d 1263, 1271-1272 (2012); Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 668,
799 P.2d 70, 74 (1990). The public policy at issue generally must be rooted in the
constitution, case law or statutory language. Edmonson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139
Idaho 172, 177, 75 P.3d 733, 738 (2003). Whether an employee is engaged in protected
activity is a question of law. Bollinger at 640-641, 272 P.3d at 1272. To determine
whether activity is protected, this Court analyzes (1) whether there is a public policy at
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stake sufficient to create an exception to at-will employment, and (2) whether the
employee acted in furtherance of that policy. Id.
As discussed below, Venable placed in the record sufficient evidence touching on all
elements of her claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy to overcome
summary judgment.
2. Venable adequately identified the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act as a sufficient source of public policy for
creating an exception to the "at-will" employment doctrine.
Venable adequately identified the Idaho Consumer Protection Act as the source of
public policy which invokes the narrow exception to the "at-will" employment doctrine
recognized in Idaho. In fact, in paragraph nine (9) of both the original and first amended
complaint, Venable cited directly to the Act. Both complaints read as follows:
Plaintiff, in fact, reported her observations of several
business acts and practices she believed violated the rights
of consumers/lenders under the Idaho Consumer Protection
Act, Idaho Code § 48-601, et seq., .... (Emphasis added).

Id. at R., VoL I, p. 17, and R., VoL I, p. 283. Yet, the district court erred by only
crediting Venable for citing to Idaho Code § 48-601 of the Act, and not the Act as a
whole, when it noted:
Significantly, Idaho Code § 48-601 simply defines the title
and purpose of the ICPA .. " As a matter of law, these
general references when coupled with the failure to identify
specifically violated regulations or laws are insufficient to
show that Venable was engaged in protected activity.
See Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 9.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - 11

Idaho Code § 48-601 is important in its own right because it identifies the purpose
behind the Act, and it is well settled that the public policy exception to "at-will"
employment must be rooted in the constitution, case law or statutory language. See

Edmonson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 177, 75 P.3d 733, 738 (2003);
see also Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op, Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 272 P.3d 1263,
1272 (2012).

But Venable, nevertheless, cited to the Act as a whole which would

encompass all other sections of the Act, including § 48-603 which reads in part:
The following unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
commerce are hereby declared to be unlawful, . . . .
(Emphasis added).

Venable further identified the Idaho Consumer Protection Act as the policy-basis
of her employment law claim by moving the district court to take judicial notice of the
same. R., Vol. I, pp. 317-319. In her request for judicial notice, Venable asked this
Court to take:
Judicial notice of the fact that the Idaho legislature has
enacted certain legislation which "shall be known and may
be cited as the' Idaho consumer protection act. '" See Idaho
Code § 48-601, et seq. Further, that when adopting the
Idaho consumer protection act, the Idaho legislature
declared certain acts or practices to be unlawful in the
conduct of any trade or commerce and such acts are
cun-ently set forth under Idaho Code § 48-603. (Emphasis
added).
Id.

Although the district court denied taking judicial notice, the fact Venable further

identified the statutory source of her public policy claim by making the request remains a
matter of record in the lower court. Id.
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The Idaho Consumer Protection Act is undoubtedly designed to protect
consumers against unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of trade or
commerce. Venable has unmistakably identified said Act and its various sections as the
source of public policy giving rise to her claim for wrongful discharge. As such, the facts
of this case are clearly distinguishable from the facts presented in the case of Bollinger v.
Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op, Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 272 P.3d 1263 (2012), a case which

the district court cited as, "illustrative for this Court." See Memorandum Decision and
Order Granting in part Summary Judgment, at R., Vol. I, p. 380. In Bollinger, the Idaho

Supreme Court stated:
Bollinger's affidavit in opposition to summary judgment
only vaguely asserts that Case "refused to implement or to
follow safety rules and regulations of which [Bollinger]
made him aware . . . and ignored requirements for
equipment; procedures; and regulations." Nowhere in her
briefing below or on appeal does Bollinger identify a legal
source for those alleged rules and regulations.
A closer look at the record reveals little more. Although
Bollinger mentions OSHA generally in her deposition
testimony, she never associates any of her complaints with
specific OSHA regulations. She only mentions that the
safety clothing she requested funding for was required by
the National Electrical Safety Code (NESC), but that code
is not legally binding on Fall River.
In fact, she
specifically states that OSHA had not adopted requirements
for the clothing at the time of her report.
Id. at Idah0642 (emphasis added).

Thus, in Bollinger, the plaintiff cited to NESC, a code with which the employer
was not legally bound to comply. Id. The plaintiff in Bollinger also cited to OSHA, but
ultimately admitted that OSHA had not adopted any applicable safety requirements
during the relevant time frame. Id. The plaintiffs failings in Bollinger have not been
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repeated by Venable here. Rather, Venable has repeatedly identified the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act as the source of public policy which protects the consumer by making it
unlawful for Internet Auto to engage in unfair and deceptive acts and practices, the type
of which have been complained of here. It is axiomatic that Internet Auto was required
to comply with the Idaho Consumer Protection Act during Venable's employment; this is
a major distinction from Bollinger.
Unfortunately, the district court failed

to

appreciate the distinguishing

characteristics in this matter from those presented in Bollinger which caused the district
court to erroneously find Venable had not engaged in protected activity.

3. Venable has produced substantive evidence showing how
the unfair and deceptive acts and practices were unlawful
under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.

Venable produced substantive evidence demonstrating multiple violations of the
Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Nonetheless, the district court when ruling on summary
judgment, concluded:
Beyond these vague references, Venable has offered no
citations or argument as to how the alleged conduct
violated the above provisions other than broad statements
that it was somehow illegal without any specific detail or
authority. General mention of laws or regulations will not
survive summary judgment. In short, even with these
undisputed facts and all reasonable inferences in Venable's
favor, she has failed to produce evidence or show how the
alleged acts were in any way unlawful.
R. Vol. I, p. 381.
Venable respectfully disagreed with the district court's conclusion that she failed
to produce evidence or show how the allegedly deceptive acts were unlawful. The record
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speaks for itself along these lines. Venable, in her own affidavit, specified the very
conduct she believed violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act:
Based upon my roughly fifteen (15) years of experience in
auto sales, I understood and believed in good faith that the
following acts and practices I observed at the dealership
were in violation of not only industry standards but also in
violation of the Idaho consumer protection act and/or the
Truth in Lending Act:
a. Internet Auto illegally passed on acquisition fees to
consumers which were in fact owed by the
dealership and then illegally charged the consumer
interest thereon;
b. Internet Auto illegally charged for auto warranties
in transactions where the consumer was purchasing
the vehicle in the "As Is" condition;
c. Internet Auto illegally charged for gap insurance in
transactions where the consumer opted out of gap
coverage;
d. Internet Auto falsely advertised vehicles "for sale"
which did not even exist in the inventory and falsely
misrepresented the history of pre-owned vehicles to
consumers;
e. Internet Auto sold vehicles to consumers in excess
of their advertised prices;
f.

Internet Auto engaged in the deceptive practice of
failing to disclose all material contractual and
financial terms to consumers, engaging in what is
known in the industrv as "packed payments";

g. Internet Auto deceived consumers into believing the
dealership had agreed to lower the sales price of
units when in fact it had only extended the term of
the loan, and thereby reduced the monthly payment
amount disclosed to the consumer;
h. Internet Auto further deceived consumers by
employing a variety of "bait and switch" tactics
designed to trick consumers into believing they
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were to receive one vehicle only to then substitute it
later for another vehicle of lesser quality and value;
R., Vol. I, pp. 337-338 (emphasis added).
In her same affidavit, Venable cited to her earlier deposition transcript where she
testified from her own personal knowledge as an employee of Internet Auto about how
the dealership engaged in the unfair and deceptive acts identified above, and referenced
the specific pages of the transcript where such testimony could be found by the district
court. R., Vol. I, p. 338.
Venable also cited to the Affidavit of Robert William Heath as providing further
testimony in corroboration of her own that the dealership engaged in deceptive and unfair
acts and practices. R, Vol. I, pp. 354-357. Mr. Heath averred in his affidavit that:
During the time of my employment at Internet Auto
Rent & Sales, General Sales Manager Chris Plaza
instructed us to sell packed payments to customers. The
practice of selling packed payments involved charging
customers extra for warranties and gap insurance that the
customers had no knowledge of. We were also told to
charge higher prices for cars than the prices listed in the
advertisements on the internet, when a customer had not
seen the advertised price.
General Sales Manager Chris Plaza also instructed
us to pass on acquisition fees to customers which were
charged by lending institutions in subprime transactions
and were to be paid directly by the dealership to the lender.
He further instructed us to include the transaction fee
charged in credit card transactions in with the purchase
pnce;
Chris Plaza also directed us to put customers in cars
even though we knew through our experience in the
industry the buyer would not likely qualify for a loan, but
this way the customer was able to drive the car off the lot
and take it home. Then the dealership would contact the
buyer a few days later and explain the deal fell through and
therefore the buyer had to return the car. Upon the buyer's
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return of the car to the dealership, we were instructed to
switch the buyer into a different car which would bring a
higher return to the dealership. Buyers often felt obliged to
buy the substituted car so as to avoid any embarrassment
associated with having a new car to having no car at all;
Internet Auto Rent & Sales would also advertise
units for sale in Boise when the car was not within the
Boise inventory, but may have been sitting on the lot in
Reno or Winnemucca. The ads however clearly depicted
the car to be on the lot in Boise;
Chris Plaza recognized many of Internet Auto Rent
& Sales customers were in desperate need to secure some

form of transportation, and so he directed us to take
advantage of the situation by employing the tactics
referenced above and others. If we did not go along with
his tactics, he would start to take away our access to
computer programs, and our access to work deals and gain
approval for deals.

Id. (Emphasis added).
The essence of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act is to protect consumers from
falling prey to unfair and deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of trade. That is
manifest in the title and purpose of the Act as set out in Idaho Code § 48-601, and in
Idaho Code § 48-603, which makes such acts unlawful, and in § 48-603(17), which
speaks to the scope of the Act by making it illegal for commercial enterprises to engage
in any activity which is misleading, false, or deceptive to the consumer.
Venable has clearly and adequately identified the source of her claim for public
policy and has demonstrated the manner in which Internet Auto has violated the letter and
spirit of the public policy embedded in the Idaho Consumer Protection Act by citing the
district court to the provisions in the Act listed above. Many of the acts committed by the
dealership as reflected in the record no doubt violated other provisions set forth in the
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Act, including Idaho Code § 48-603(2), § 48-603(4), and § 48-603(9). These sections
respectively ban acts causing confusion as to the source and approval of financing, ban
the use of deceptive designations of geographic origin, and ban the advertising of goods
with the intent not to sell them as advertised. Id.
Accordingly, the district court committed reversible error when concluding "even
with these undisputed facts and all reasonable inferences in Venable's favor, she has
failed to produce evidence or show how the alleged acts were in any way unlawful." R.
Vol. I, p. 381.
4. Venable has shown she engaged in activity protected by the
public policy exception to the "at-will" doctrine.
As noted above, Venable must show she was terminated for engaging in protected
activity, which includes: (1) refusing to commit an unlawful act; (2) performing an
important public obligation; or (3) exercising certain rights or privileges. Bollinger v.
fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., lnc., 152 Idaho 632, 640-641, 272 P.3d 1263,1271-1272

(2012); Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 668 (1990).

Venable has made the proper showing. First, there is no question that Venable was
hired to fill the position of Internet Manager on March 15, 2011. There is no question
that just a short time later Venable was involuntarily terminated by Internet Auto on April
21, 2011.

In between her date of hire and her date of termination, the record

unequivocally reflects Venable reported to Internet Auto the fact the dealership was
engaging in deceptive and unlawful acts and practices in violation of Idaho law. In fact,
Venable testified how she "complained loudly and boldly" about very specific tactics the
dealership used to deceive its customers. R., Vol. I, p. 259. During her deposition,
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Venable documented and discussed the manner in which the dealership carried out the
unlawful and deceptive acts and practices. R., Vol. I, p. 260. Internet Auto has not
challenged Venable's reporting and the existence of these acts and practices with any
specific, objective evidence.
Internet Auto repeatedly told Venable that: "This is how we do business" and to "Get
on board." R., Vol. I, p. 338. When Venable refused, the dealership first suspended
Venable's access to key programs which infringed on her ability to realize sales, and then
finally terminated her employment at the dealership. R., Vol. I, p. 339. During her
deposition, Venable succinctly stated the grounds of her termination

"They fired me

because I refused to break the law." R., Vol. I, p. 261.
When applying the standard on summary judgment to the facts of record, Venable
clearly presented a viable claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The
fact Venable reported and refused to commit the unlawful acts of violating customers'
rights under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act could not be clearer from the record on
appeal. Venable's refusal to commit unlawful acts presents a well recognized exception
to at-will employment, as does her fulfillment of performing the important public
function of reporting such violations to management at Internet Auto. Sorensen v. Comm
Tek, inc., 118 Idaho 664, 668, 799 P.2d 70, 74 (1990). There is no doubt that the public

policy at stake here is rooted in the statutory framework of state law. The state of Idaho
has a strong public policy interest in protecting consumers and lenders from unlawful
business acts and practices. The public policy is manifest in the enactment of the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act. Here, Venable plainly acted in furtherance of the sound public
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policy at issue. Venable spoke out about the unlawful acts and practices and ultimately
sacrificed her livelihood by refusing, herself, to engage in such activity.
Venable has furthermore shown that her termination was in fact motivated by her
reporting of and refusal to commit illegal acts. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized
the question of causation is generally one for the jury. See Bollinger v. Fall River Elec.

Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 640-641, 272 P.3d 1263, 1271-1272 (2012). The temporal
relationship between Venable's reporting of the unlawful acts and her refusal to get on
board with such tactics, coupled with her involuntary termination alone gives rise to jury
questions.

In other words, a jury could reasonably infer from the surrounding

circumstances that the motivation for the termination derived from Venable's refusal to
"break the law." Under the fact pattern of this case, based upon the summary judgment
standard, district courts are really not at liberty to accept as true the employer's position
that the employee was fired for some other legitimate reason.

Van v. Portneuf Med.

Center, 147 Idaho 552, 560, 212 P.3d 982, 990 (2009). This legal principle holds true
here since Internet Auto's given reason for the termination makes no sense.

On the

termination form, it reflects the discharge was due to "services no longer needed." R.,
Vol. I, p. 261.

Under the facts of this case, Internet Auto's stated reason for the

termination smacks of pretext. Venable had been hired to fill the position of Internet
Manager on March 15, 2011, and fired just a short time later because her services were
no longer needed. How could Venable's services no longer be needed in such a short
time after her date of hire? It is not as though Internet Auto shut down its internet
department. Then, later on during the unemployment proceedings, Internet Auto's basis
for the termination shifts from services no longer needed to not meeting sales goals. R.,
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Vol. I, p. 261. In other words, Internet Auto's stated basis for the termination shifted
from non-performance-based to performance-based reasons, when it asserted its position
before the Idaho Department of Labor. Id. Most assuredly, a sufficient record has been
made by Venable to send the issue of causation to a jury.
Accordingly, Internet Auto's motion for summary judgment respecting the claim for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy should not have been granted by the
district court.
C.

The District Court Erred in Denying Venable's Second Motion for
Reconsideration of the Grant of Summary Judgment on the Claim for
Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy based upon Evidence
adduced during the Jury Trial on the related Slander Per Se Claim.

After the jury trial, Venable filed her second motion for reconsideration
concerning her claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy based, in part,
upon the trial testimony of witness Chris Plaza. R., Vol. I, pp. 427-430. At trial, Chris
Plaza confirmed he was the General Sales Manager for Internet Auto during Venable's
term of employment there. Tr., p. 321, Ll. 11-21. Mr. Plaza clearly testified that it would
"Absolutely" be considered a deceptive business practice to pass acquisition fees onto
customers without the customer's knowledge. Tr., p. 347, Ll. 7-19. When ruling on the
second motion for reconsideration, the district court acknowledged the foregoing
testimony proffered by Mr. Plaza: "Mr. Plaza testified that passing on such acquisition
fees would be deceptive, and that packing payments would be deceptive or unethical."
R., Vol. I, p. 440. Mr. Plaza's trial testimony coupled with the sworn testimony of Mr.

Heath, previously cited above and reiterated here, no doubt confirms the district court
should have granted Venable's second motion for reconsideration:
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During the time of my employment at Internet Auto Rent &
Sales, General Sales Manager Chris Plaza instructed us to
sell packed payments to customers. The practice of selling
packed payments involved charging customers extra for
warranties and gap insurance that the customers had no
knowledge of. We were also told to charge higher prices
for cars than the prices listed in the advertisements on the
internet, when a customer had not seen the advertised price.
General Sales Manager Chris Plaza also instructed us to
pass on acquisition fees to customers which were charged
by lending institutions in subprime transactions and were to
be paid directly by the dealership to the lender. He further
instructed us to include the transaction fee charged in credit
card transactions in with the purchase price.
R., Vol. I, p. 355 (emphasis added).

The district court committed clear error in denying Venable's second motion for
reconsideration.
D.

Attorney Fees on Appeal.

Venable is entitled to recover her attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 12-120(3). This section allows for the recovery of reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party in commercial transactions.

"Actions brought for breach of an

employment contract are considered commercial transactions and are subject to the
attorney fee provision ofLC. § 12-120(3)." Willie v. Bd. Of Trs. , 138 Idaho 131, 136,59
P.3d 302, 307 (2002) (citing Northwest Bec Corp., 136 Idaho 835, 842, P.3d 263, 270
(2002); Treasure Valley Gastrenterology Specialists, P.A., v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485, 492,

20 P.3d 21, 28 (Ct. App. 2001).
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CONCLUSION

Venable respectfully seeks a reversal of the district court's order granting
summary judgment to Internet Auto on Venable's claim for wrongful discharge
violation of the public policy embodied in the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.

DATED: This

;).~ day of October, 2013.
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III

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING, DELIVERY, OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

~day of October, 2013, I served a true

and correct copy of the foregoing document by delivering the same to each of the
following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:

o mailed
!RI hand delivered
o transmitted fax machine
to: (208) 319-2601
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Phillip S. Oberrecht, Esq.
Jason R. Mau, Esq.
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht, P.A.
950 W. Bannock S1., Ste. 950
Boise, ID 83702

